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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This appeal by Timothy Booth from an order of the 
District Court dismissing his prisoner's civil rights action 
presents two important questions about the meaning of the 
mandatory administrative exhaustion requirement in the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (the PLRA). Booth 
alleges that while he was confined in the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania's State Correctional Institute at Smithfield, 
several prison guards, on several occasions, punched him 
in the face, threw cleaning material in his face, shoved him 
into a shelf, and tightened and twisted his handcuffs in 
such a manner as to injure him. Asserting his Eighth 
Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual 
punishment, Booth, acting pro se, brought this 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983 excessive force action in the District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania, requesting various forms of 
monetary and injunctive relief. He did so withoutfirst 
exhausting the administrative remedies available to him at 
Smithfield. Because of this failure to exhaust his 
administrative remedies, the District Court dismissed his 
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a). 
 
As amended by the PLRA, S 1997e(a) provides that "[n]o 
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions 
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, 
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 
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correctional facility until such administrative remedies as 
are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a) 
(amended by Pub. L. 104-134, Title I, S101(a), 110 Stat. 
1321-71 (1996)). The first question raised by Booth's appeal 
concerns the applicability of S 1997e(a) toS 1983 excessive 
force actions; i.e., whether excessive force is a"prison 
condition" for purposes of the PLRA. This important and 
difficult question is a matter of first impression for this 
court. Booth contends that S 1997e(a)'s "action . . . with 
respect to prison conditions" language applies only to 
complaints about the physical conditions in prisons, and 
does not apply to his S 1983 excessive force action. 
Therefore, he concludes, the District Court erred in 
analyzing his action under S 1997e(a). We reject this 
argument and hold that S 1997e(a) applies to excessive 
force actions. We base this decision on the plain meaning 
of the language of the PLRA, case law from our sister 
circuits, and recent Supreme Court precedent interpreting 
similar prisoner litigation legislation. 
 
The second question raised by Booth's appeal has to do 
with the application of S 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement. 
Booth argues that even if S 1997e(a) applies to his action, 
exhaustion would have been futile, because the available 
administrative process could not provide him with the 
monetary relief he seeks. Accordingly, he contends, his 
failure to exhaust such procedures is not mandated by 
S 1997e(a), which only requires the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies "as are available." 
 
Our recent decision in Nyhuis v. Reno, No. 98-3543, 2000 
WL 157531, at *11 (3d Cir. Feb. 15, 2000), rejected this 
argument. Nyhuis was a Bivens action brought by a federal 
inmate, in which we held that "the PLRA amended 
S 1997e(a) in such a way as to make exhaustion of all 
administrative remedies mandatory--whether or not they 
provide the inmate-plaintiff with the relief he says he 
desires in his federal action." Id. at *1. The reasoning of 
Nyhuis applies equally in the S 1983 context, as S 1997e(a) 
treats Bivens actions and S 1983 actions as functional 
equivalents. Nyhuis is therefore controlling in this case. 
 
Accordingly, even though this is an excessive force 
action, and even though the Commonwealth of 
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Pennsylvania's inmate grievance process could not provide 
Booth with the money damages he sought, we hold that 
Booth was required by S 1997e(a) to exhaust the 
administrative remedies available to him prior tofiling this 
action. Because he admittedly has not done so, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.1 
 
I. 
 
On April 21, 1997, Booth began this action in the District 
Court, using a form provided by the court to prisoners filing 
pro se complaints under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. He named 
Corrections Officer Churner, Sergeant Workensher, 
Lieutenant Rikus, and Captain W. Gardner as defendants. 
He stated that he had presented the facts of the case in the 
state prisoner grievance procedure and that his allegations 
were "dismissed or covered up." He added,"There isn't any 
help because of retaliation because I spoke up about abuse 
and corruption." In the space provided for "Parties" he 
added Superintendent Morgan to the list of defendants. In 
the space labeled "Statement of Claim" he wrote nothing. In 
the space labeled "Relief " he asked both for a "preliminary 
injunction," and for a "protection order for transfer to 
another prison as my safety and life is at stake." 
 In a handwritten document filed with his form complaint, 
Booth alleged the following facts, which gave rise to his 
S 1983 action. He first complained that, in April 1996, he 
had been "assaulted by a Sgt Robinson and a C/O named 
Thomas . . . ." As a result of that assault, he alleges, he has 
"a shoulder that slips in and out." Subsequent to that 
incident, he contends, he was denied an operation on his 
shoulder with "deliberate indifference to [his] shoulder and 
back." Booth next averred that on February 6, 1997, he 
threw water on Corrections Officer Thomas, who then took 
him to a storage room and threw a cup of cleaning material 
in his face. 
 
Booth further claimed that on February 7, 1997, after an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We express our appreciation to Nancy Winkelman, Esquire, who, 
acting pro bono at the request of the court, represented Mr. Booth both 
ably and zealously. 
 
                                4 
 
 
exchange of words with Lieutenant Rikus, Rikus shoved 
him into the shelf in the storage room and Thomas pushed 
him into a door, while Sergeant White looked on. He alleges 
that shortly thereafter he was taken back to his cell, where 
Thomas tightened and twisted his handcuffs in such a way 
that bruised his wrists. Booth last complained that, on 
March 23, 1997, Corrections Officer Churner punched him 
in the face and mouth, while Sergeant Workensher and 
Corrections Officer Kulian watched. As a result, he 
contends, his mouth "was busted open" and he received 
three stitches. Booth ended this narrative, "I need out of 
this jail before they kill me. And I want each and every 
officer to be punished for assaulting me. Please, I'm in fear 
of my life." 
 
In a document dated May 19, 1997, he petitioned"To 
Show Cause for Appointment of Counsel, To Keep Top 
Officials as Defendants, Amending Relief Plaintiff Seeks." In 
this petition, he asked for "an injunction to stop the 
continuous beating," an order "to get operation," a transfer 
to another prison, and "money damages $750,000 
(permanent damages)." In later paragraphs, he again asked 
for an injunction, a transfer, and for money damages in 
different amounts; he also asked for an order to improve 
the prison law library and to fine prison officials for 
contempt of court, for an order to hire paralegal assistance 
for himself, and for "money damages $300,000." In 
"Plaintiff 's Amendment to Specific Relief," filed the next 
day, he asked for a protective order to be transferred to 
another jail, appointment of counsel, a pretrial hearing, a 
disclosure order for prison records, and $400,000 for 
"nominal, punitive, exemplary, and compensatory" 
damages. 
 
The District Court, acting sua sponte and without 
requiring an answer from the Defendants, dismissed 
Booth's action without prejudice on May 30, 1997, as it had 
the power to do under 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(c). The rationale 
for the Court's order was that Booth had failed to exhaust 
his administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
S 1997e(a) before filing his S 1983 action. The Court 
observed that at the time Booth filed his action the 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections had a three-step 
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grievance procedure. Booth had taken the first step in the 
process but made no showing that he had taken the second 
and third steps, which required that he appeal the decision 
reached by the prison officials in the first step.2 The court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Department of Corrections 
Consolidated Inmate Grievance System consists of a three-part 
administrative process. Grievances must be submitted, in writing, for 
initial review to the Facility/Regional Grievance Coordinator, within 
fifteen days after the events upon which the claims are based. See 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections, 
Consolidated Inmate Grievance Review System, Policy No. DC-ADM 804 
SS VI.A.1, VI.B.2. (Oct. 20, 1994). Extensions of this time period may be 
granted for good cause. See id. S VI.B.2. 
 
The procedures for filing such a claim are straightforward. Once 
submitted, the grievance is investigated and persons having personal 
knowledge of the subject matter may be interviewed. See id. S VI.B.3. If 
the grievant requests a personal interview, the policy provides that one 
"shall" be granted. Id. Within ten working days of receipt of the 
grievance 
 
by the Grievance Officer, the policy provides that"the grievant shall be 
provided a written response to the grievance to include a brief rationale, 
summarizing the conclusions and any action taken or recommended to 
resolve the issues raised by the grievance." Id. S VI.B.2. 
 
Within five days of the receipt of this initial determination, the 
grievant 
 
may appeal the determination to the appropriate intermediate review 
personnel. See id. SS VI.C.1, 2. The intermediate review personnel have 
ten working days after the receipt of the appeal to notify the grievant of 
their decision. See id. S VI.C.4."This decision may consist of approval, 
disapproval, modification, reversal, remand or reassignment for further 
fact finding, and must include a brief statement of the reasons for the 
decision." Id. In the third, and final, step of the process, "[a]ny inmate 
who is dissatisfied with the disposition of an Appeal from an Initial 
Review decision, may, within seven (7) days of receiving the decision, 
appeal [to the Central Office Review Committee (the CORC)] . . . for final 
review." Id. S VI.D.1. Absent good cause, final review is not permitted if 
a grievant has not complied with the procedures governing Initial Review 
and Appeal from Initial Review. See id.S VI.D.2. On final review, the 
CORC (1) has the power to require additional investigation before it 
makes its determination, see id. S VI.D.5; (2) may consider matters 
related to the initial grievance, see id.S VI.D.6; and (3) may, in its 
final 
decision, approve, disapprove, modify, reverse, remand or reassign the 
grievance for further fact finding, see id.  S VI.D.7. The CORC must issue 
its decision within twenty-one days after receipt of an appeal, and it 
must include a brief statement of the reasons for the decision it reaches. 
See id. As noted above, Booth concedes that he did not avail himself of 
either the intermediate or final review process. 
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concluded that as Booth had not exhausted his available 
remedies, dismissal was required by S 1997e(a). In reaching 
this conclusion, the District Court assumed, without 
discussion, that Booth's excessive force action was 
governed by S 1997e(a). 
 
On June 9, 1997, Booth moved for reconsideration of this 
order. On July 3, the District Court denied this motion. 
Booth moved to amend his complaint, and on July 17, 
1997, this motion was "dismissed as moot, as plaintiff 's 
case was closed on May 30, 1997." Booth thereafter 
appealed. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1291.3 
 
II. 
 
We first examine whether the words "action . . . with 
respect to prison conditions" in S 1997e(a) were intended to 
apply to excessive force actions such as Booth's. Section 
1997e(a) provides that 
 
       [n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison 
       conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other 
       Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, 
       or other correctional facility until such administrative 
       remedies as are available are exhausted. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The District Court dismissed Booth's S 1983 claim without prejudice. 
To be appealable under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, an order of dismissal must 
ordinarily be with prejudice. See, e.g. , Bahtla v. U.S. Capital Corp., 
990 
 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1993). In Garber v. Lego, 11 F.3d 1197, 1198 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 1993), we recognized an exception to that general rule. We noted 
that a plaintiff can appeal from a dismissal without prejudice when he 
declares his intention to stand on his complaint or when he cannot cure 
the defect in his complaint. See id.; see also Bethel v. McAllister Bros., 
Inc., 81 F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir. 1996) (recognizing the same exceptions); 
Trevino-Barton v. Pittsburgh Nat. Bank, 919 F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(same). These two conjunctive preconditions are clearly met in this case. 
In briefing this issue and at oral argument, Booth's counsel stated that 
Booth had elected "to stand on his complaint without amendment." 
Additionally, both parties agree that the time is long past for Booth to 
pursue his normal administrative remedies; therefore, he cannot cure 
the defect in his complaint on which the District Court based its 
dismissal. 
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42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a) (emphasis added). Booth argues that 
his S 1983 excessive force action is not governed by 
S 1997e(a) for three reasons. First, he contends that the 
words "prison conditions" simply cannot be read to include 
a prison guard's intentional act of violence. Second, he 
argues that, when one reads the PLRA and its legislative 
history as a whole, there is no basis to conclude that 
S 1997e(a) was meant to reference claims of excessive force. 
Third, Booth points to two recent Supreme Court cases, in 
which the Court has drawn a line between excessive force 
actions, which involve intentional acts of violence, and 
conditions-of-confinement actions, which do not. Booth 
submits that, in enacting the PLRA, Congress evinced no 
intent to disturb this distinction when it employed the 
"prison conditions" language it did in S 1997e(a). We take 
up these arguments in turn. 
 
A. 
 
We would normally begin our analysis of S 1997e(a) by 
looking to the plain meaning of the words "action. . . with 
respect to prison conditions" that Congress employed in 
drafting that section. Congress, however, defined the term 
"civil action with respect to prison conditions" in another 
section of the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. S 3626(g)(2), and thus 
spared us from that inquiry, see Freeman v. Francis, 196 
F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that "the scope of 
S 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement is determined by the 
definition of a `civil action with respect to prison conditions' 
as set forth in S 3626(g)(2)"). 
 
To borrow from the Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Stroop, 
"[t]he substantial relation between the two[provisions in 
the PLRA] presents a classic case for application of the 
normal rule of statutory construction that identical words 
used in different parts of the same act are intended to have 
the same meaning." 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (citations and 
internal quotations omitted). The PLRA not only amended 
42 U.S.C. S 1997e to include various limitations on actions 
such as the mandatory exhaustion requirement in 
S 1997e(a), it also created 18 U.S.C. S 3626, which in many 
subsections, prevents federal courts from ordering broad 
prospective relief in "any civil action with respect to prison 
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conditions." Like S 1997e, S 3626 curbs the extent to which 
federal prison litigation interferes with the states' and the 
federal government's administration of their own prisons. 
Because these two sections of the PLRA are directed toward 
similar ends and are thus substantially related, it follows 
from the canon of interpretation invoked in Stroop that the 
identical terms used in the two sections should be read as 
conveying the same meaning. See Freeman, 196 F.3d at 
644. 
 
Section 3626(g)(2) provides that 
 
       the term "civil action with respect to prison conditions" 
       means any civil proceeding arising under Federal law 
       with respect to the conditions of confinement or the 
       effects of actions by government officials on the lives of 
       persons confined in prison, but does not include 
       habeas corpus proceedings challenging the fact or 
       duration of confinement in prison. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 3626(g)(2) (emphasis added). 
 
As a matter of common sense, we understand the 
"conditions of confinement" language preceding the "or" to 
include complaints such as those regarding cell 
overcrowding, poor prison construction, inadequate medical 
facilities, and incomplete law libraries. Put differently, 
actions arising under this clause relate to the environment 
in which prisoners live, the physical conditions of that 
environment, and the nature of the services provided 
therein. Booth's allegations that prison guards used 
excessive force against him do not naturally fall into this 
class of actions. 
 
Booth's action does, however, fit neatly into the language 
in S 3626(g)(2) following the "or," which refers to any civil 
action with respect to "the effects of actions by government 
officials on the lives of persons confined in prison." 18 
U.S.C. S 3626(g)(2). We read this clause to refer to civil 
actions ranging from excessive force actions, such as 
Booth's, to actions "with respect to" a prison official's 
decision not to make basic repairs in the prison, or 
intentionally to deny a prisoner food, heating, or medical 
attention. All of these actions affect the lives of prisoners 
similarly: They make their lives worse. 
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B. 
 
This common sense reading of the language in 
S 3626(g)(2) comports with the manner in which the 
Supreme Court has read similar language in statutes 
dealing with prison litigation. In McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 
U.S. 136, 137 (1991), the Court was faced with a similar 
provision in a prison litigation statute, 28 U.S.C. 
S 636(b)(1)(B), which authorized the nonconsensual 
reference to magistrate judges of "prisoner petitions 
challenging conditions of confinement." In ruling on the 
scope of S 636(b)(1)(B), the unanimous Court interpreted 
the section's "conditions of confinement" language--one 
half of the definition of "prison conditions" in S 3626(g)(2)-- 
to include all inmate petitions, not only those regarding 
"continuous conditions," but "isolated episodes of 
unconstitutional conduct," such as the petitioner's claim of 
excessive force, as well. McCarthy, 500 U.S. at 139. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court wrote: 
 
        We do not quarrel with petitioner's claim that the 
       most natural reading of the phrase "challenging 
       conditions of confinement," when viewed in isolation, 
       would not include suits seeking relief from isolated 
       episodes of unconstitutional conduct. However, 
       statutory language must always be read in its proper 
       context. . . . 
 
        The text of the statute does not define the term 
       "conditions of confinement" or contain any language 
       suggesting that prisoner petitions should be divided 
       into subcategories. On the contrary, when the relevant 
       section is read in its entirety, it suggests that Congress 
       intended to authorize the nonconsensual reference of 
       all prisoner petitions to a magistrate. 
 
Id. at 139 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
As compared to the statute in McCarthy, Congress, in the 
PLRA, made its intent to subject all prisoner actions (save 
for habeas petitions) to S 1997e(a)'s exhaustion 
requirements even more clear. It did so by employing the 
language it did in S 3626(g)(2). In S 3626(g)(2), Congress 
included both the "conditions of confinement" language, 
which was enough in McCarthy to encompass all prisoner 
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petitions, and the "effects of actions by government 
officials" language, which, on natural reading, more closely 
refers to isolated episodes of unconstitutional conduct at 
the hands of prison officials--such as the instances of 
unconstitutional excessive force alleged in the case at bar. 
The addition of the language in S 3626(g)(2) avoids the plain 
meaning problem with the statute at issue in McCarthy, 
and it clarifies Congress's intent to subject all inmate 
actions to the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. 
 
The context of the PLRA supports this conclusion. The 
PLRA was plainly intended, at least in part, to"reduce the 
intervention of federal courts into the management of the 
nation's prison systems." Freeman v. Francis , 196 F.3d 641, 
644 (6th Cir. 1999). Congress would only undermine this 
objective by carving out certain types of actions from the 
aegis of the PLRA. Therefore, we believe that the expansive 
and somewhat overlapping language Congress employed in 
S 3626(g)(2) must be read--naturally and in its proper 
context--to encompass all prisoner petitions. 
 
The only court of appeals explicitly to address the 
question agrees with our conclusion. Relying on McCarthy 
and the definition of "action with respect to prison 
conditions" in S 3626(g)(2), the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit recently held "that the term `prison conditions' 
as used in S 1997e includes claims of excessive force . . . ." 
Freeman, 196 F.3d at 644. The Courts of Appeals for the 
Fifth and Tenth Circuits have implicitly reached the same 
conclusion--that excessive force actions are "prison 
conditions" actions and subject to the exhaustion 
requirements set forth in S 1997e(a)--without discussing 
the precise argument raised by Booth and adopted by the 
dissent. See Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 889, 891-92 
(5th Cir. 1998) (applying S 1997e(a)'s exhaustion 
requirement to inmate-plaintiff 's excessive force claim); 
Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 1264-66 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(same).4 In the margin, we respond, in part, to the dissent's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The other courts of appeals that have been presented with the issue 
have declined to resolve it for different reasons. See Miller v. Tanner, 
196 
F.3d 1190, 1191 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999) (declining to resolve the issue in 
light of the fact that the court disposed of the appeal on other grounds); 
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adoption of Booth's position.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1999) (recognizing that the 
law concerning the PLRA's "action . . . with respect to prison conditions" 
language was in flux, but refusing to resolve the question "without the 
benefit of a more complete record"); Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064, 
1066 n.2 (9th Cir. 1999) (declining to address the issue because "it was 
not raised below"). District courts are split on the issue. Those holding 
that excessive force actions fall under S 1997e(a) include the District 
Court in the present appeal, Beeson v. Fishkill Correctional Facility, 28 
F. 
Supp. 2d 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (Mukasey, J.), and Johnson v. Garraghty, 
57 F. Supp. 2d 321 (E.D. Va. 1999) (Ellis, J.). These courts rely on 
McCarthy and the definition of "action with respect to prison conditions" 
in S 3626(g)(2) to support their holding. District courts holding to the 
contrary include White v. Fauver, 19 F. Supp. 2d 305 (D. N.J. 1998) 
(Orlofsky, J.), and Carter v. Kiernan, No. 98 Civ. 2664(JGK), 1999 WL 
14014 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1999) (Koeltl, J.). 
 
5. Without addressing McCarthy, except to mention our reliance on it, 
the dissent advances plain meaning and legislative history arguments to 
support its position. The dissent parses the phrase"prison conditions" in 
S 1997e(a)--looking to its definition in Webster's and in 28 U.S.C. 
S 3626(g)(2)--and concludes that the phrase does not encompass claims 
of excessive force. As do we in addressing S 3626(g)(2)'s definition, the 
dissent divides the section's language into its two components. It opines 
that the "statutory phrase `conditions of confinement' [in S 3626(g)(2)] 
do[es] not encompass specific batteries." Dissent at 22. As noted above, 
we take no exception to the dissent's understanding of this clause. See 
supra Section II.A. If Congress had only used the "conditions of 
confinement" language in S 3626(g)(2), we would be forced, as was the 
Court in McCarthy, 500 U.S. at 139-44, to query whether this language 
was employed in the context of the statute to connote something other 
than its most natural meaning. See supra Section II.B. (The dissent 
engages in this "contextual" analysis of the PLRA, but for reasons 
explained in note 9, infra, we are unconvinced by its reading.) 
 
Addressing the second half of the definition provided in S 3626(g)(2), 
the dissent continues: "A guard hits you on the mouth. Would you report 
the blow by saying, `A government official has taken an action having an 
effect on my life?' No speaker of English would use such a 
circumlocution." Dissent at 23. Relying on what it concedes are 
"[s]nippets of legislative history," id., the dissent concludes that the 
statutory phrase "effects of actions by government officials on the lives 
of persons confined in prisons," 28 U.S.C.S 3626(g)(2), was intended to 
refer only to actions by prison officials such as"[the delivery of] 
 
                                12 
 
 
C. 
 
Booth attempts to buttress his reading of S 1997e(a) by 
pointing to Supreme Court precedent that has drawn a 
distinction between excessive force claims and prison 
condition claims. When pressed by logic, however, this 
argument proves as brittle as the analysis it was erected to 
support. 
 
A familiar maxim of statutory construction provides that 
" `[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated 
settled meaning under either equity or the common law, a 
court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that 
Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of 
these terms.' " United States v. Rosero , 42 F.3d 166, 171 
(3d Cir. 1994) (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co. , 453 U.S. 
322, 329 (1981)). Invoking this maxim, Booth cites two 
recent Supreme Court cases in which the Court 
distinguished between conditions-of-confinement claims 
and excessive force claims, and treated the two types of 
claims differently. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 
832 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
lukewarm food; . . . employ[ing] unlicensed barbers; . . . admit[ting] 
more 
 
prisoners than the prison was designed for; . . . . decid[ing] to provide 
creamy peanut butter instead of chunky; . . . decid[ing] not to offer 
salad 
 
bars or weekend brunches; [or] . . . decid[ing] to play classical music on 
the prison stereo system"--not a punch in the jaw or a blow to the body. 
Id. at 22-23 (citing 141 Cong. Rec. S14611-01, S14627 (Sept. 29, 1995)). 
 
We find this reading of the second half of S 3626(g)(2) unconvincing. 
For us as for the court in Freeman, 196 F.3d at 644, the phrase 
naturally references isolated acts taken by prison officials that affect 
prisoners' rights, including alleged acts of excessive force, see supra 
Section II.A. If one were to accept the dissent's narrower reading of 
S 3626(g)(2), the two clauses employed inS 3626(g)(2) would be narrower 
than the lone "conditions of confinement" clause employed by Congress 
in McCarthy, 500 U.S. at 139-44. See supra Section II.B (discussing 
McCarthy). The claim that the addition of the"effects of acts of 
government officials" clause renders the scope of S 3626(g)(2) narrower 
than the provision at issue in McCarthy is unconvincing, especially when 
the additional clause in S 3626(g)(2) clearly broadens the scope of the 
section. 
 
6. In Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, the Supreme Court distinguished the 
"extreme deprivations" that are necessary to make out a "conditions-of- 
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From the distinction drawn by the Court in Farmer and 
Hudson, Booth reasons that if Congress intended to 
eliminate that distinction in S 1997e(a) between excessive 
force and prison condition claims it would have made its 
intentions explicit. 
 There are four things wrong with this argument. First, 
and most obvious, Congress made its intentions clear 
regarding what "actions with respect to prison conditions" 
meant in S1997e(a), by defining that term expressly and 
expansively in S 3626(g)(2). Congress's explicit language in 
the PLRA, therefore, obviates the need to resort to the 
maxim. See NLRB, 453 U.S. at 329. 
 
Second, if we were to ignore the import of S 3626(g)(2)'s 
definition and apply the maxim based on language in 
Farmer and Hudson, we would ignore the difference in the 
nature of the power allocated to the courts and Congress in 
our tripartite federal system. As Judge Mukasey noted in 
his forceful opinion in Beeson v. Fishkill Correctional 
Facility, which held that S 1997e(a) applied to excessive 
force claims, "a court's responsibility in reading S 1997e is 
to determine the intent of Congress when it referred to 
`prison conditions' in the statute, not the intent of the 
Supreme Court when it used a similar, but not identical, 
term in a case decided before the statute was passed." 28 
F. Supp. 2d 884, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (referring to Farmer 
and Hudson). 
 
Third, there is no evidence, other than the Court's use of 
similar language in Farmer and in Hudson , that the term 
"prison conditions" has a well-settled meaning, firmly 
established in the annals of the common law. In fact, 
Farmer and Hudson refer to "conditions of confinement" 
claims, not "prison conditions" claims.7 The difference 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
confinement claim" from the lesser showing necessary to make out an 
excessive force claim. In Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-36, the Court again 
relied upon this distinction to hold that the mental state necessary to 
make out an excessive force claim was lesser than the showing required 
to establish a conditions-of-confinement claim. 
 
7. In Hudson, the Court wrote, "[E]xtreme deprivations are required to 
make out a conditions-of-confinement claim. . . . In the excessive force 
 
                                14 
 
 
between the terms of art invoked in Farmer and Hudson 
and in this case makes resort to maxim even more 
unreliable. 
 
Fourth, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's opinion in 
McCarthy, the phrase "conditions of confinement," which 
Booth would have us equate with the phrase "prison 
conditions," is not so commonly understood. In McCarthy-- 
which was decided near the time that Farmer and Hudson 
were, but prior to the PLRA's enactment--the Supreme 
Court had to interpret the phrase "petitions challenging 
conditions of confinement" in 28 U.S.C. S 636(b)(1)(B). As 
noted above, the Court read the phrase to include 
challenges not only to ongoing prison conditions, but also 
to isolated episodes of allegedly unconstitutional conduct 
by prison officials, such as assault. See id.  at 141-43. 
Judge Mukasey put it well in Beeson when he wrote, "the 
Court [in McCarthy] made absolutely no mention of the 
supposedly familiar distinction between excessive force 
claims and conditions of confinement claims, despite 
effectively being presented with the issue squarely." 28 F. 
Supp. 2d at 891 (citation omitted). The fact that the terms 
"prison conditions" and "conditions of confinement" seem to 
have different meanings in different contexts again makes 
invocation of the maxim of interpretation inappropriate. 
 
With Farmer and Hudson cast in their proper light, we 
are confident in holding that S 1997e(a)'s exhaustion 
requirement does apply to excessive force claims. 8 As we 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
context, society's expectations are different." 503 U.S. at 9 (emphasis 
added). In Farmer, the Court wrote, "In its prohibition of `cruel and 
unusual punishments,' the Eighth Amendment places restraints on 
prison officials, who may not, for example use excessive physical force 
against prisoners. The Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, 
who must provide humane conditions of confinement . . . ." 511 U.S. at 
832 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
8. In reading Farmer and Hudson, we do not believe that we have blurred 
the distinction drawn by these cases between excessive force actions and 
conditions-of-confinement actions. Those distinctions, of course, still 
obtain in substantive eighth amendment jurisprudence. However, for the 
many reasons detailed in the text, that distinction appeared not to be on 
Congress's mind--nor did it control Congress's hand--when it crafted 
the procedural bars it did in the PLRA. 
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hold that Booth's S 1983 excessive force action is governed 
by S 1997e(a), we turn our attention to whether S 1997e(a)'s 
exhaustion requirement bars it. Before doing so, we 
address (in the margin) another argument advanced by the 
dissent in support of Booth's reading of the "prison 
conditions" language in the PLRA.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The dissent reasons that in enacting the PLRA Congress was 
concerned only with frivolous prisoner lawsuits, such as those 
enumerated in note 5, supra, rather than" `brutal violations of prisoners' 
rights,' " Dissent at 24 (quoting 141 Cong. Rec. S14408-01, S14418 
(Sept. 27, 1995) (Sen. Hatch)). Therefore, it concludes, S 1997e(a) was 
not intended to encompass excessive force claims. Wefind three things 
wrong with this argument. 
 
First, in recounting the large number of lawsuits brought by prisoners 
in the few years preceding the passage of the PLRA, several members of 
Congress cited statistical evidence regarding the number of actions filed 
by prisoners, and the crushing burden these suits have on federal 
courts. See Blas v. Endicott, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1133 n.4 (E.D. Wis. 
1999) (collecting examples of this legislative history). The statistical 
studies they cited did not distinguish between conditions-of-confinement 
actions and excessive force actions, or even those addressing the brutal 
violations of prisoners' rights. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S3703 (daily 
ed. 
 
Apr. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (noting that "[i]n 1995, 
65,000 prisoner lawsuits were filed in federal courts alone" without 
distinguishing among the many types of suits filed); 141 Cong. Rec. 
S14626-27 (daily ed. Sept, 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) 
(cataloguing the some 39,000 non-habeas lawsuitsfiled by inmates in 
federal courts in 1994, and, as with Sen. Abraham, not distinguishing 
between conditions-of-confinement actions and excessive force actions). 
The way this data was presented supports the conclusion that S 1997e(a) 
applies to all prisoner lawsuits, all of which have the potential to be 
frivolous and unduly burden courts, rather than a particular 
subcategory of claims, as the dissent contends. 
 
Second, examination of the PLRA's legislative history reveals that 
opponents of the PLRA objected to it on the ground that it would 
frustrate prisoners in their attempts to pursue meritorious S 1983 
excessive force actions. See 141 Cong. Rec. S14628 (1995) (statement of 
Sen. Biden) (discussing two prison assault cases as examples of 
meritorious suits that would be hindered by passage of the PLRA). These 
remonstrations--and Congress's failure to heed them--suggest that, in 
enacting the PLRA, Congress knew what it was doing, and intended that 
excessive force actions be subject to the exhaustion requirements in 
S 1997e(a). 
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III. 
 
Turning our attention to the application of S 1997e(a) to 
Booth's action, Booth concedes that he did not take full 
advantage of the administrative procedures available to him 
at Smithfield. After he was allegedly assaulted by the 
Defendants, he filed several administrative grievances with 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Department of 
Corrections Consolidated Inmate Grievance System (the 
Inmate Grievance System). When his requests for relief 
were denied, however, he failed to appeal those decisions as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Third, sections of the PLRA other than S 1997e(a) address the 
frivolous/non-frivolous lawsuit distinction to which the dissent is so 
attuned. See Dissent at 22-24. For example, 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(c)(1) 
empowers district courts to dismiss frivolous claims, of the chunky 
peanut butter variety, sua sponte. Similarly, 28 U.S.C. S 1915(b) 
discourages inmates from filing frivolous suits by forcing inmate- 
plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis to pay court costs and filing 
fees. 
 
Lastly, 28 U.S.C. S 1915(g) closes the door, absent exceptional 
circumstances, to inmate-plaintiffs who previously have brought three 
frivolous lawsuits. 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a), by contrast, makes no mention 
of the word "frivolous." Nor does it except from its broad swath actions 
with respect to " `brutal violations of prisoners' rights,' " Dissent at 5 
(citation omitted), as other sections of the PLRA, such as 28 U.S.C. 
S 1915(g), explicitly do, see 28 U.S.C. S 1915(g) (allowing a inmate- 
plaintiff who has previously brought three frivolous actions to bring a 
subsequent civil action if he is "under imminent danger of serious 
physical injury"). 
 
If anything, S 1997e(a)'s mandatory exhaustion requirement enables 
district courts hearing these prisoner claims to distinguish better 
between frivolous and meritorious ones. As we noted recently in Nyhuis 
v. Reno, "The administrative process can serve to create a record for 
subsequent proceedings, it can be used to help focus and clarify poorly 
pled or confusing claims, and it forces the prison to justify or explain 
its 
internal procedures." No. 98-3543, 2000 WL 157531, at *10 (3d Cir. Feb. 
15, 2000). The administrative process therefore makes prisoner litigation 
claims more transparent and easier to review. Operating effectively, the 
administrative process should also afford district courts more time to 
address the serious concerns raised by meritorious claims. As Nyhuis 
further noted, S 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement was, in part, designed 
to provide federal courts more time to deal with such actions. See id. at 
*7-10. 
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was his right under the Inmate Grievance System. See 
supra note 2 (discussing the two-stage appellate process). 
Again, S 1997e(a) provides that 
 
       No action shall be brought with respect to prison 
       conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other 
       federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, 
       or other correctional facility until such administrative 
       remedies as are available are exhausted. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1997e(a) (emphasis added). 
 
Booth reads this language to mean that he did not need 
to take advantage of the Inmate Grievance System's 
administrative procedures because they could not provide 
him with the monetary relief that he sought in his federal 
action. For this proposition he cites, among other cases, 
Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882 (5th Cir. 1998), Lunsford v. 
Jumao-As, 155 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1998), and Garrett v. 
Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 1997). These cases hold 
that when a prison's internal grievance procedure cannot 
provide an inmate-plaintiff with the pure money damages 
relief he seeks in his federal action, exhaustion of those 
administrative remedies would be futile.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The Defendants argue that Booth requested only injunctive relief in 
his complaint, and thus he did not request remedies"not available" in 
the state's administrative process. Although Booth's pro se complaint 
form does not include a specific request for damages, the thirty some 
pages attached thereto make several references to personal injuries and 
make three separate claims for monetary relief. See supra Part I. 
Construing Booth's pro se complaint liberally, as we must, see, e.g., 
Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dep't., 91 F.3d 451, 456 (3d Cir. 
1996), we conclude that he did request monetary relief in his original 
complaint, when that complaint is viewed as a whole. Moreover, even if 
Booth's initial complaint failed to allege money damages, the record 
shows that he amended his complaint to include a request for damages, 
as was his right under FED. R. CIV. PRO. 15(a). In separate pleadings 
filed 
 
seven days and a month after his original complaint, Booth again made 
reference to his allegations regarding money damages. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 
15(a) provides that "[a] party may amend the party's pleading once as a 
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served . . . 
." 
Judging from the docket entries, the Defendants served no responsive 
pleadings between the time Booth filed his April 21, 1997 complaint and 
the time that he filed these later pleadings. 
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Our recent opinion in Nyhuis v. Reno, No. 98-3543, 2000 
WL 157531, at *5 (3d Cir. Feb. 15, 2000), rejected the 
narrow futility exception recognized in Whitley , Lunsford, 
and Garrett; and the rule announced in Nyhuis is 
dispositive in this case. In Nyhuis, we held that "the PLRA 
amended S 1997e(a) in such a way as to make exhaustion 
of all administrative remedies mandatory--whether or not 
they provide the inmate-plaintiff with the relief he says he 
desires in his federal action." Id. at *1. In a lengthy opinion, 
we detailed the many arguments supporting our position, 
and ultimately rejected the approach taken by courts 
recognizing the futility exception. See id. at *5-11. 
 
Although Nyhuis involved a Bivens action brought by a 
federal inmate, the rule we announced in Nyhuis  has equal 
force in the S 1983 context, for S 1997e(a), which applies to 
actions brought by a prisoner "under section 1983 of this 
title, or any other federal law," treats Bivens actions and 
S 1983 actions as functional equivalents. See Nyhuis, 2000 
WL 157531, at *3; Lavista v. Beeler, 195 F.3d 254, 256 (6th 
Cir. 1999); Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1324-25 
(11th Cir. 1998); Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 1264-66 
(10th Cir. 1997). Indeed, the Nyhuis rule has even greater 
force with respect to S 1983 actions. First, as we explained 
in Nyhuis, additional comity considerations obtain in the 
S 1983 context--which are not implicated by a Bivens 
action--given the strength of the interest that state prisons' 
and state courts' have in resolving complaints filed by state 
prisoners. See Nyhuis, 2000 WL 157531, at *9 n.11 (citing 
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92 (1973) 
(discussing these comity concerns)). 
 
Second, additional federalism and efficiency 
considerations are implicated when reviewing S 1983 
actions--as compared to Bivens actions--because of the 
greater difficulty federal courts may have in interpreting 
and/or predicting the contours of state law and state 
administrative regulations and practices. See id. at *9 n.10 
and accompanying text. As we noted in Nyhuis, the 
Supreme Court has "made it clear that `in the absence of a 
plain indication to the contrary,' Congress should not be 
understood to `mak[e] the application of[a] federal act 
dependent on state law.' " Id. at *9 n.10 (quoting Mississippi 
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Choctaw Indian Band v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989)) 
(emphasis added by Nyhuis) (citations and internal 
quotations omitted). In drafting the PLRA, "Congress gave 
no indication--let alone a `plain indication'--that 
application of S 1997e(a) should depend on the vagaries of 
state law." Id. For these reasons, we therefore hold that the 
rule we announced in Nyhuis applies here. 
 
As in Nyhuis, because Booth "failed . . . to exhaust his 
available administrative remedies (rather than those he 
believed would be effective)" before filing hisS 1983 action, 
the District Court appropriately dismissed his action 
without prejudice. Id. at *11. Accordingly, the order of the 
District Court will be affirmed. 
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NOONAN, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting: 
 
The crux of the case is what Congress meant by the 
statutory term "prison conditions." Of the two words, 
"conditions" is the key. The noun is plural. It is equivalent 
to "circumstances." It does not identify a single or 
momentary matter. Webster's provides us with six 
definitions. Five are not germane. The relevant definition is 
"existing state of affairs," as in the common phrases "living 
conditions," "playing conditions," "adverse weather 
conditions." A slight variant of this definition is "something 
needing remedy," as in the sentence, "Trains were late to 
Philadelphia because of conditions on the Main Line." As 
these instances suggest, "conditions" are circumstances 
affecting everyone in the area affected by them. 
"Conditions" affect populations, large or small. 
 
The statute thus gives us a noun of established meaning 
and frequent use. This noun is modified by a second noun, 
"prison." No ambiguity exists as to its meaning. It identifies 
the affected population. We have, then, a statutory term 
"prison conditions" that can only mean "a state of affairs in 
a prison" or "something needing remedy in a prison." The 
slight variation does not alter the sense conveyed by 
"conditions" of more than a momentary event;"conditions" 
means something that has continued in effect for a period. 
 
A punch on the jaw is not "conditions." A punch in the 
jaw in prison is not "prison conditions." A punch on the jaw 
is an act. Churner's alleged busting of Booth's mouth is not 
a state of affairs. Circumstances in the plural are not at 
issue. No population is affected. An individual alone is 
involved. That Churner's alleged blow took place in a prison 
does not make it "prison conditions." Reading the statute as 
it is written it is next to impossible to characterize Booth's 
complaint of a specific battery as a suit "with respect to 
prison conditions." 
 
The court rightly notes that we may aid our reading by 
consulting another section of the statute where Congress 
has defined "prison conditions" for another purpose. It 
makes good sense to assume that the definition applies 
throughout the statute and to use the definition whenever 
"prison conditions" are mentioned. 
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In S 3626(g)(2) Congress defined "prison conditions" as 
"conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by 
government officials on the lives of persons confined in 
prison." The definition is good evidence that when Congress 
wanted to extend the meaning of "prison conditions" 
beyond the ordinary sense of the phrase it knew how to do 
so. In this definition, Congress did not extend the meaning 
of "prison conditions" to include acts of battery carried out 
by officers of a prison. The statutory phrase"conditions of 
confinement" does not encompass specific batteries. 
"Conditions of confinement" is no more apt than "prison 
conditions" to designate an act of battery. The use of 
"conditions" constrains the sense so that what is meant is 
a continuing state of affairs. The court concedes that this 
part of the statutory definition has no application here. 
 
The court invokes McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136 
(1991), but then does not rely on the statutory language 
there construed but on the alternative definition afforded by 
the statute. This definition defines prison conditions as "the 
effects of actions by government officials on the lives of 
persons confined in prison." What are actions by 
government officials that impact the lives of prisoners and 
appropriately fit within the framework of conditions? 
Illustrations are afforded by a proponent of the PLRA, 
Senator Abraham: "how warm the food is, how bright the 
lights are, whether there are electric lights in each cell, 
whether the prisoners' hair cut is by licensed barbers," 
these are "the conditions" regarding which prisoner 
litigation has occurred and courts have intervened because 
of the effect of these conditions on prisoners' lives. 142 
Cong. Rec. S10576-02, S10576 (Sept. 16, 1996). To take 
another illustration, "even worse" according to Senator 
Abraham, is a judge releasing prisoners "to keep the prison 
population down to what the judge considered an 
appropriate level." Id. In each of these instances an action 
by a government official -- to provide a kitchen or delivery 
service leading to lukewarm food; or to save on electricity; 
or to employ unlicensed barbers; or to admit more 
prisoners than the prison was designed for -- has an 
impact on prisoners' lives and creates conditions that, but 
for the PLRA, might become the subject of a suit. Other 
actions having an effect on prisoners' lives and referenced 
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by Senator Reid, are these: a prison official decides to 
provide creamy peanut butter instead of chunky or provides 
chunky peanut butter instead of creamy; a prison official 
decides not to offer salad bars or weekend brunches; a 
prison official decides to play classical music on the prison 
stereo system. 141 Cong. Rec. S14611-01, S14627 (Sept. 
29, 1995). These actions indubitably had an effect on 
prisoners' lives by creating conditions that, prior to passage 
of the PLRA, gave rise to prison litigation. In no way are any 
of these actions comparable to specific acts of intentional 
violence. Brutal batteries are far removed from what the 
sponsors said was on their minds. The senators chose 
language for the statute mirroring their concerns. 
 
Snippets of legislative history such as these are not 
necessary to explain the statutory phrase. They are, 
however, to the point in a way that interpretations of the 
legislation offered in by its opponents in debate are not. 
They are, moreover, illuminating as to why Congress had to 
use fifteen words in a seemingly elephantine way to define 
the suits Congress wanted to restrain. The multitude of 
trivial occasions that might affect prisoners' lives could only 
be captured by a calculated comprehensiveness that 
excludes individual acts of rape or beating. 
 
A guard hits you on the mouth. Would you report the 
blow by saying, "A government official has taken an action 
having an effect on my life?" No speaker of English would 
use such a circumlocution. Why should we attribute such 
circuitousness to Congress? When bones are broken or 
mouths are mauled, no one on earth, educated or 
uneducated, would use such roundabout phraseology to 
express the blow. 
 
The supposition that Congress spoke so ineptly may be 
sustained by the suspicion that Congress wanted to get rid 
of all prisoner litigation, therefore Congress must have 
intended to embrace allegations of specific acts of battery. 
As a guess at unarticulated policy, such speculation has its 
attraction. The suspicion is dispelled by leading sponsors of 
the PRLA such as the chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, Senator Hatch. As he put it when offering the 
bill for the first time in 1995: "Our legislation will also help 
restore balance to prison conditions litigation and will 
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ensure that federal court orders are limited to remedying 
brutal violations of prisoners' rights." 141 Cong. Rec. 
S14408-01, S14418 (Sept. 27, 1995). As he summarized 
the sponsors' intent: "I do not want to prevent inmates from 
raising legitimate claims. This legislation will not prevent 
those claims from being raised." 141 Cong. Rec. S14611- 
01, S14662 (Sept. 29, 1995). The sponsors of the bill were 
neither inhumane nor insensitive nor determined to 
foreclose federal fora to claims of unconstitutional acts of 
cruelty. 
 
The legislative history serves to refute a suspicion 
unsupported by the statutory text. As a guide to a fair 
reading of the English language in the statute before us, 
the suspicion is mischievous. It leads to a construction of 
language that cannot be sustained. The canons of 
construction of our native tongue should not be contorted 
to deny a remedy that a conscientious Congress continues 
to provide. 
 
There are, to be sure, issues raised as to prison 
conditions in Booth's amended complaint -- the state of the 
prison library, for example, Booth's need for a paralegal, or 
the failure of prison authorities to prevent alleged beatings. 
No cause of action against Superintendent Morgan, Captain 
Gardner or Sergeant Workensher can be discerned that 
does not fall within the meaning of prison conditions. These 
complaints Booth should have processed through the 
prison grievance system. Failing to do so, Booth cannot 
pursue them now. As to these claims, I concur with the 
court. But that he put these matters into his complaint 
does not mean that he forfeits the claims whose treatment 
was not required to begin administratively. As to Lieutenant 
Rikus, no specific injury is alleged for which compensation 
is asked. The complaint here, too, is properly dismissed. 
The allegations against Churner, Robinson and Thomas 
survive. As to them I respectfully dissent. 
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